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Abst rac t  - -  Much recent work in reasoning systems has concentrated on the role of time in 
planning, action modeling, and tasks in domains where time is important. On the other hand, there 
are systems that concentrate on spatial reasoning, especially where manipulation or managing of the 
environment is important, as in robot route planning. The integration of the two themes is a goal 
which, if possible, would allow the interaction of space and time to be explored. A problem-solving 
system would then be able to reason about the times at which actions might occur, in the light 
of spatial constraints, or vice versa, to reason about the places in which actions take place, and 
the temporal constraints involved. This paper shows a way to integrate the representation f both 
time and space in a framework that allows uniform reasoning across both dimensions. An ontology 
for objects, events, states, and processes i provided using conceptual graphs for representation, 
and a ayIitactic extension to Sowa's conceptual graph formalism (see Sowa's article, this vohune) is 
presented to support he effort. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper has two aims. Tile first aim is to improve tile support that Sowa's conceptual graph 
theory has for automated reasoning, especially ill tile spatio-temporal domain. Ill order to achieve 
this, syntactic and semal, tic extensions have been made to the basic theory of conceptual graphs. 
The second aim is to develop the semantic extensions through all ontology of time and space 
that allows their essential duality to emerge. The syntactic extensions are tile addition of an 
overlay graph that contains actor nodes to support reasoning, rather than relying on purely 
logical inference techniques, as Sowa does [1]. The explicit representation f reasoning elements 
is preferable in practical knowledge representation systems, as has been shown repeatedly in tile 
knowledge ngineering literature. Conceptual Programming (CP) is a working implementation f
the ideas presented in this paper, and has been used successfully to support tle Model Generative 
Reasoning systems developed at the Computing Research Laboratory (see [2,3]). 
2. CONCEPTUAL GRAPHS WITI{ ACTORS 
A conceptual graph is a labeled bi-partite directed graph. The two kinds of nodes are concept 
nodes, which are rectangular boxes labeled with the name of a type taken from a lattice of such 
types, and relation nodes, which are oval boxes labeled with the name of a relation taken from a 
set of such relations. Additionally, the concept node can contain a referent field (separated from 
the type label by a colon) that names an individual object that conforms to the type whose label 
is in the node. In expressiveness these graphs are equivalent to FOPC with sorts. Tile relation 
nodes correspond exactly to n-place predicates, and the concept nodes to either an existentially 
quantified, but sorted variable, or to a constant whose sort is known. Universal quantification may 
be achieved through special individuals (essentially an "individual" that represents he set of all 
known instances of the type mentioned) or through negated contexts. Sowa's context corresponds 
to a scoped expression in FOPC. 
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Figl,re !. A conceptual graph, an actor overlay and the overlaid graph. 
In his book [l], Sowa also shows how unknown objects (nodes with no individual field) can 
be computed by an actor node that corresponds to a function in standard logics. Thus, the 
inclusion of functions ill FOPC can be handled by conceptual graphs in a highly visual way, 
that has many benefits when it comes to providing practical knowledge systems to be used by 
people not well-versed in formal methods. Actor nodes of this kind are diamond-shaped boxes 
connected to concept nodes with dashed lines. In our extensions to conceptual graph theory, we 
give these actors the capability of computing quantilative constraints in a Prolog fashion, i.e., 
of doing constraint propagation through a system of values and variables. This is the constraint 
level of CP. 
The focus of this paper is our extension of conceptual graph to a spatio-temporal level that 
uses qualitative actors that propagate constraints among moments in time when acts occur and 
locations of objects in space. This level requires a syntactic extension to conceptual graphs in 
order that the diagrams not become too confused and thus lose their force. In this paper we 
shall concentrate on the spatio-temporal level only. Interested readers can see a report on the 
constraint level in [4]. In the rest of the paper an 'actor' refers to this spatio-temporal ctor, not 
to the quantitative constraint variety. 
2.1. The Semantics of Actors 
An actor can best be thought of as an implicit relation between semantic objects represented 
in graphical form. The relation can be made explicit by interpreting the constraints expressed by 
the actor and its connections (inputs and outputs, roughly speaking) just as a rule in a rule-based 
system can be thought of as an implicit relation between its left and right-hand sides. 'Firing' 
the rule computes the relation. The CP  actors, however, can be run forwards or backwards, or 
operate as constraint checkers, just as a Prolog rule can. In this manner an actor can compute 
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a missing relation. Temporal actors compute missing temporal relations, and spatial actors 
compute missing spatial relations. 
g.g. The Syntaz of Actors 
The inputs and outputs of a spatio-temporal actor are things like acts, events, objects, regions, 
etc. i.e., the language of the ontology of space and time. This ontology is presented briefly in the 
next section. In conceptual graphs many of these ontological entities are represented by two or 
more objects related through a single relation node. Some way of connecting an actor to one of 
these partial graphs is thus required. We have chosen to extend the syntax of conceptual graphs 
for these actor connections by allowing arcs to come out of a relation node, and be connected to 
an actor through a special spatio-temporal elation node. In the basic theory relation nodes can 
only connect o concept nodes. Our extension presents no ambiguity, however, since a relation 
node connected to another elation node must be an actor input or output. 
Since the actor and its relations are additions to an already existing graph, we can think of 
the addition as an overlay graph. The analogy here is of overhead slides being laid on top of one 
another to produce a complete diagram. Figure I shows a graph, a simple one-actor overlay and 
the graph that results from laying the overlay on the first graph. 
[BALL  : @2] 
(ATTR)  - ,  [COLOR : Br i l l iant  - white] 
- -  (C t l I tC )  - -  [WEIG I IT  : c~51bs] 
J BALL:@2 ] 
Figure 2. The bali's propertic~. 
3. THE DUALITY OF SPACE AND TIME 
In this section we summarize an ontology for space/time that will prove suitable for representa- 
tion in the extended conceptual graph theory outlined above. It is mainly aimed at determining 
what things can be inputs or outputs to spatio-temporal actors. The discussion will not be deep, 
in a philosophical sense; we only aim to explore the worth of adding spatio-temporal actors to 
conceptual graph theory in order to provide a useful tool. Most of the discussion is therefore at a 
commonsense level; the level at which practical knowledge representation is typically done. All of 
Sowa's base theory is incorporated, including the primitive relations, and the simple breakdown 
of concept ypes into objects, acts and properties. We only consider ordinary objects and acts at 
a human scale. There is no attempt to incorporate the micro-scale of quarks, waves et al. or the 
astronomical scale of galaxies and gravity. Each ontological entity will be introduced and defined 
as the interpretation of a particular canonical conceptual graph. These graphs are summarized 
after the discussion in Figure 3. 
The appropriate concepts in the domain of time are the moment (sometimes called an instant) 
and the time interval. The corresponding duals in the spatial domain are the location, and the 
region, which is intended to capture xtent in three dimensions, just as an interval captures extent 
in the single dimension of time. We will also need to talk of objects (usually physical objects) 
and acts. Both entities have aspects of both space and time, of course, and the interesting things 
start to occur when the two are related. 
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Figure 3. Canonical graphs for each of the spati~temporM entities. 
4. ADDING STRUCTURE:  STATES AND PROCESSES 
The simple existence of objects and acts (and perhaps relations between them) is not sufficient 
alone to form a model of space/time. In particular we need to talk about properties of objects 
and acts. This not only serves to differentiate different ypes and instances of these types, but 
also will serve as the basis of the integration of space and time. Objects can have two sorts of 
property. One sort is an intrinsic property, which we shall call (after Sows [1]) a characteristic. 
This is a member of that set of features without which the object would not be an object, 
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such as its size, shape and mass. They are basically spatial in nature, with a less important 
temporal component. For instance, an object has a shape and size and mass, the persistence of 
which ensures the object's continued existence. On the other hand, objects can have accidental 
features, that are more temporal (i.e., changeable) in nature. These include, color, temperature, 
speed, etc. These are attributes. The object with its collection of properties makes a state. One 
relation and its associated object and property (or properties in the case of multi-way relations) 
is a partial state. 
Acts also have attributes and characteristics. These properties are either temporal or spatial 
in nature. Characteristics include rate, acceleration (or qualitative counterparts like quickness) 
and start and end times (both moments). Attributes, which are more spatial in nature, include 
direction, range, and orientation. The act and its properties makes a process. One relation, with 
its act and property is a partial process. 
[GiVE]- 
- (AGT) -- [PERSON: or] 
-- (PTNT) --  [BALL] 
-- (EX PR) -- [PERSON :'Y] I'-2S77~ 
Figure ,I. Tile graph for GIVE. 
[TI IROW]- 
- .  (ACT) --. [PERSON] 
--. (PTNT) --. [BALL] --. (CIIRC) --. [SMALL] 
-- (MANn)  -- [ttAnOl 
Figure 5. The graph for THROW. 
4.1. Representation of  Objects and Acts 
At this point we should introduce part of the representation to be used later for integrating 
space and time. Here we follow Sowa [1]. Both objects and acts are assumed to be typed, both 
can be instantiated with an individual. A type is represented by an upper-case label and any 
individual of this type is represented by the label in square brackets. Thus [BALL]  represents a 
ball, and [CATCH]  represents an act of catching. Properties are also typed, and represented in
the same way. So [COLOR] represents a color, and [SPEED]  a speed. Individuals of any type 
are placed after the type label, separated by a colon. Thus [BALL  : @2] denotes two balls, and 
[COLOR : Br i l l i ant  - white] might be their color. [CATCH : #234] is the act of catching with 
the unique identifier 234 which distinguishes this act from all others, including those of different 
types. 
The relationships of properties to the objects and acts they modify is done with a relation 
label in parentheses. The direction of the relation is indicated by arrows. Figure 2 shows the 
conceptual graph representing the color and weight of two balls, together with its linear form. In 
the paper we will use either form as appropriate, although CP uses the pictorial form exclusively. 
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Acts can be similarly represented, e.g., 
[THROW:  #'234] - -  (MANR)  - -  [SOFT]  
represents a gentle throw, where THROW:#234 is an act of throwing, MANR is a relation 
between the act and a property indicating the manner in which the act is carried out. In this 
case the manner is SOFT, for softly. 
4.2. Relationships Between Entities 
Now that we have a notation for describing objects and acts, we can consider relationships 
between objects, between acts, and between objects and acts. These relationships will give us a 
basic set of representations to support reasoning. 
Like an object's properties, relationships between objects are largely spatial in nature. These 
include out-and-out spatial relations like left-of, above etc., but also relationships of containment, 
support, and inclusion (e.g., part/whole). A single object and its properties and their values (if 
known) give the familiar notion of a state. The set of all objects and their spatial relations we will 
call a schematic. If we gather all the objects in our universe together with their properties and 
their spatial relationships at one moment, we have the common notion of a snapshot. We must 
include in the ideas of state, schematic, and snapshot hat it exists at a particular moment, and 
that any part of it can, and will, change through time. One spatial relation and its associated 
object(s) is a partial schematic. 
Thc relationships between acts are largely temporal in nature. Again, there are obvious ones 
likc after, before, overlap a la [5]. There can also be abstract relationships like causes, enables, 
or triggers. Their couunon link is their pcrv~ivencss throughout space, whcther it is the action 
at a distance involved in causality, or their applicability irrespective of location. They will tend 
to pervade space unless delimitcd by an object, just as state relationships persist unless changed 
by an act. A number of acts and their temporal relationships forms a chronicle. Thc collection 
of acts, tl,cir propcrties and temporal relationships we will call a history. This is a "temporal 
snapshot" (there is no term in English for this, apart from history) fixed in space. Any aspect 
of a chronicle i.e., a single relationship and its associated acts is a partial chronicle. It can, and 
does, change with location. The TI IROW example is a partial process, whereas 
[TI IROW : #234] --, (BFOR) -- [CATCtl :#345] 
is a partial chronicle, since there are two acts, and one completes before the second starts. 
Objects participate with a single act to form an event. The relationships here are ttle standard 
case relations well-known in knowledge representation. Thus, agent, patient, experiencer, instru- 
ment etc. relate an act to its participants. Tile spatial cases, such as location, path, direction etc. 
are considered here as properties of an act, as are the temporal cases such as duration and rate. 
The case relations cannot form partial processes or states, whereas the spatial and temporal ones 
can. In fact, it is probably better to think of the event as the atomic unit (albeit with structure) 
corresponding to an act, and the ezperience as atomic in the spatial sense. An experience is a 
single object and all its associated acts. Events are time-independent since their acts carry with 
them a time interval, one of tile distinguished characteristics mentioned above. Experiences are 
location-independent, since their objects carry an intrinsic region with them. 
Figure 3 shows canonical graphs for each of the ontological entities introduced above. In the 
diagram, three concept ypes are used: PROP, ACT and OBJ.  There are five kinds of relation 
labels, each of which stands for a set of relations disjoint from any other set. They are: 
• SR: a Sp~tiafl Relation, between two objects, 
• TR: a Temporal Relation, between two acts, 
• CR: a Case Relation, between an act and art object, 
• APR: an Act Property Relation between an act and one of its properties, 
• OPR: an Object Property Relation between and object and one of its properties. 
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Figlire 6. Time cltarts for tile input temporal relations. (1) is a triggering 
enablement witere the situation triggers the act a~ld persists after the act fin- 
ishes. (2) is the inverse where the absence of tile situation is the trigger. (3) is 
a temporary enabling condition where tile situation that eimhlcs the act disap- 
pears at tile end of tile act. (4) is again tile inverse. (5) and (8) axe pennmaent 
enabling conditions where tile situation (or its absence) persists even though 
the act terminates. (7) shows an interrupt enablement where the situation is 
interrupted by the act, but resumes after tile act finishes. (8) is the inverse of 
tiffs, but ca~l also be seen as the situation and act coinciding in their start and 
end points. 
5. REASONING WITH EVENTS AND EXPERIENCES 
Reasoning has two main requirements. First, a set of linking forms that relate knowledge 
structures together according to a pre-defined principle, and secondly a way of operationalizing 
the inference of one structure given another. In much of AI this amounts to using rules expressed 
as implications and then using modus ponens for inference in some variety of classical logic. Other 
approaches, uch as production systems, semantic networks and frames are reducible in some sense 
or other to logic. These alternative approaches, however, all have aspects that are not easily 
reducible to logic. They mostly revolve around the mechanisms used to make inferences. Logic, 
per se does not specify such mechanisms, although proof techniques are essential in all but trivial 
cases. The question is how can we specify mechanical procedures that allow the correct, desired 
inferences to be made without also making incorrect, unwanted ones. The current concentration 
in AI on non-monotonic systems is one such an attempt. Here we employ an approach borne 
out of a combination of simulation, that we call small-case reasoning, and a combining technique 
based on Sowa's maximal join. The first requirement for reasoning mentioned above is satisfied 
by rules, both temporal and spatial at the level of spatio-temporal entity, and by maximal join 
at the level of whole graphs. 
As its major form of knowledge structure, CP employs the schema, which is similar in many 
ways to the cases of case-based reasoning (CBR) (e.g., [6]). However, schemata in CP are "small" 
cases in the sense that each schema only focuses on one term (a single concept ype). They are 
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Figure 7. Time charts for the output emporal relations. 
more likely to be correct in the sense that their place in a larger structure will be secure, without 
the fix-up rules that CBR employs when cases do not match known facts. We call each schema 
a definition of tile term in question, although there can be many such definitions, reflecting tile 
variety of localized situations where the term call be used. Lansky's use of localized representa- 
tions is similar [7], although our use of the term more accurately coincides with IIayes' notion of 
conceptual closure [8] in that each definition includes an adequate set of related terms to make 
a conlplete, coherent definition. The multiple sdmmata for a term allow for the fact that such 
closures are not unique. 
A schema contains only events (and experiences), the base components of reasoning. Figure 4 
shows a definition of giving. It shows an event involving three objects none of which has a partial 
state. Throwing might, however, contain a partial state for the object, as well as a partial process 
of the direction in which the object is thrown, as in Figure 5 where the bali's characteristic of
smallness forms part of its state. 
On top of a schema there can be up to three 'overlays,' one to infer temporal relationships, 
one to infer spatial relationships, and one that computes functional relationships between the 
individuals involved. The last overlay, the constraint overlay, will not be discussed here, but 
briefly it can be used to carry out quantitative computing such as can be found in more standard 
simulation languages [4]. 
6. THE REPRESENTATION OF RULES FOR TEMPORAL REASONING 
Rules in CP are represented as actors, whose sole job is to act as confluence points for the 
knowledge structures that have to be related. All of the actors are constraint-like in that they 
can operate forwards or backwards. However, temporal actors are often regarded as operating 
forwards, in tile direction of time. Thus, inputs to an actor are pre-conditions for the actor's 
firing, and outputs are post-conditions. In the temporal domain, inputs are partial states and 
schematics, ince these are exactly what is expected to change in time. For instance, the possession 
of a ball by a person is a partial schematic; the possession of the same ball by another person is 
another one. Each temporal actor also has an act (really a process) as input, at least one partial 
state or schematic as input and one as output. The crucial part of the whole idea of the overlay 
comes, however, with the temporal relationships that the act bears to the inputs and outputs. We 
have appealed to simple ideas of causality to analyze the possible relationships. First, let us call 
partial states and schematics collectively situations. Causally speaking, a situation can enable 
or trigger an act, and the act can terminate that situation (or not). If, in addition, we allow the 
absence of a situation to have the same causal status i.e., enabling or triggering, then we arrive 
at a total of eight combinations of a single input situation and an act. These are displayed in 
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< CATCH - POSS > - 
,- (ACT) -- [CATCH]  
- -  (SCHEM)  - -  (POSS) -  
- -  [BALL]  
• -- [PEnSON]  
(CATCI I I  I ( 
(POSS) I ~" 
Figure 8. The temporal overlay for CATCtl with the actor's time chart. The 
shaded nodes are not part of the overlay, but are part of the schema for CATCH. 
Figure 6 in time chart form (time increases to the right) with each one having the situation on 
top and the act below. A vertical ine on an end-point indicates a change start to stop (or vice 
versa), and an arrow head indicates an uuknown end-point. These time charts are si~rfilar in use 
and meaning to the time maps of Dean and McDermott [9]. Notice that each of the interval pairs 
(except 8 and 7) |lave correspondence to Allen's relations [5]. 
Tile same ideas can be applied to output situations, changes which are caused by an act. An 
output situation can be started by an act's starting, started by the event's ending, or coincide 
exactly with the event: Again the inverses involving the situation's absence complete the picture. 
Now we get six possibilities (Figure 7). 
When relations like these are used in a temporal overlay, we get a rule-like structure that can 
be incorporated into a larger structure and used in a simulation. A simple example is shown in 
Figure 8. Tile relations on the actor node < CATCH > effectively type the inputs and outputs. 
The type can either be ACT, indicating connection to an act node, SCHEM for connection to 
a partial schematic, or STATE for connection to a partial state. Recall that partial schematics 
or states are s i luat ions  and both have an interval associated with them in the time chart. Tile 
direction of the arrows connecting through the type node indicate whether it is an input or 
output. Each actor has a time chart associated with it that gives the exact relationships of the 
intervals and moments involved. Note that the act is incompletely specified (there are no case 
relations), but the time chart, and hence any temporal inferences do not depend on them. This 
graph could be overlaid on a more complete description (mentioning, for instance the direction 
of travel and the nature of the ball). 
The overlay for the example involving GIVE might be as in Figure 9. This then is the purpose 
of a temporal overlay, to show how situations change in time when directly affected by acts. Note 
that unless changed by an act, a situation will persist, as demanded by the basic assumptions. 
Note also that if the absence of a situation is to participate in causality (usually in enablement) 
then the relation (property or spatial) must be represented explicitly. For this reason, relations 
in CP cannot be given interpretations of true or false, but only of possibility. 
l Moreover, the effect can be delayed, as in the delay between a ball being thrown and it breaking a window. 
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< GIVE-  POSS > - 
- -  (ACT)  - -  [G IVE]  
.- (SCHEM)  -- (POSS) -  
-- [BALL  : ob] 
-- [PERSON : . .] ,  
-- (SCHEM)  -- (POSS) -  
-- [BALL: *hi 
-- [PERSON : =,V] 
[GIVEJ } 
(POSS) : 
(I'O.'/S) = 
Figure 9. The temporal overlay for GIVE with the actor's time chart. The 
shaded nodes are part of the schema for GIVE, but are not included i .  the 
overlay. 
7. THE REPl i .ESENTATION OF R.ULES FOR SPATIAL KEASONING 
We can now apply the same uotior.s to create spatial actors corresponding to the temporal 
actors just discussed. Where the temporal overlay placed partial states or schematics in temporal 
relationship, tile spatial one places partial processes or chronicles in spatial relatiouships. Clearly 
we need at least two partial processes or chronicles to do this, together with all object (properly 
an experience) so we will need at least two acts. Notice that ill both the single act cases, the only 
spatial inference is that all objects occupy the same region as tile act. Only when two acts occur 
can eutities be spatially differentiated. Similarly, when only one object participates in several 
events, no temporal differentiation can be made, since there can be no change of state. 
Each spatial rule will be represented by an actor corresponding to an object. Whereas the 
temporal actors are directional, according to the forward flow of time, there is no such constraint 
on spatial actors. They execute, therefore, very much like Prolog rules, i.e., they can operate 
forwards or backwards. Since there is no distinction between inputs and outputs, no relation to 
a spatial actor has an arrow-head. 
Consider a person grasping a ball, throwing it and catching it again. There are two partial 
chronicles--the succession of temporal relations between the three acts. The BALL spatial actor 
will then constrain the regions occupied by the partial chronicles to intersect he bali's region, 
just as the temporal actor constrains the intervals of tile partial states to bear a pre-determined 
relationship to its act's interval. Objects can partially or totally constrain a partial chronicle, or 
not at all. These factors give rise to seven possible classes of spatial relations (Figure 10). These 
are similar to the set of mereological relations (i.e., those concerning the connections between 
regions) discussed by Randell and Cohn in [10]. We have added a distinction, however, between 
two regions which share a common space--INSD, (inside) and a region which takes space away 
from another- - lNVD (invades). The former covers the case of two acts one of whose regions 
contains the other. The latter covers the case of a solid object invading a region in which an act 
occurs; the act does not extend to the inside of the object, but only surrounds it. The overlay 
is shown below followed by a diagram (Figure 11) that approximates in two dimensions the 
relationships between the regions occupied by the ball and the three events. Really it is only the 
intersection of the bali's region with the overlap between the events' regions (i.e., that occupied 
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unconnected touching Inle~ecting 
(LEFT, RGHT, etc.) TOUCH) 0 NTE) 
bordering mnlain~ coinciding invading 
(BORO) (INSD) (COIN) (INVD) 
Figure 10. The dyadic spatial relations which can appear in a spatial map. 
< BALL  > - 
- (OB J}  - [BALL]  
- (C I IRON)  - (BFOR) -  
---* [THROW : ,t] 
- [cnasP l ,  
- (C/tnON) - (BFOR)- 
- .  [c a ' rcu l  
.--- [T I IROW : ot] BALL 
Figure 11. The spatial layout for BALL. The bali's region ties together the 
regions of graJping, catching and throwing since the shaded regions must be 
non-empty. 
by tile partial chronicle) that can be inferred. Note, for instance, that there is no information 
to constrain the CATCH to the same region as the THROW.  However, they must overlap, 
and this overlap must (at least) intersect he bali's region. Note that an act's region cannot 
be determined unless all of its objects are specified, although one object can provide a partial 
constraint. 
8. THE INTEGRATION OF  TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL RULES 
The symmetries alluded to in the introduction can be seen by considering a canonical graph 
with two acts and two objects (actually objects or properties) and their possible relations. A fully 
connected version is shown in Figure 12. The CR labels denote case relations, TR is a temporal 
relation and SR is a spatial relation, as in the diagram of the canonical forms (Figure 3). Since 
both TR and SR are present, there is no reason to specify an act actor, whether spatial or 
temporal, since their job is to compute missing relations. Figure I3 shows the square first with 
a missing temporal relation, and secondly with a missing spatial relation. The missing relations 
are computed by the actors as shown. When both sorts of overlay are included in the same 
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Figure 12. The canonical space/time square, where ACT denotes any act, 
OBJ any object, and CR, SR and TR denote any case, temporal or spatial 
relation respectively. No relations are missing, so no actors axe needed. The 
directionality of the relations is left unspecified. 
Figure 13. The canonical graph with actors supplying nfissing relations. On 
the left a temporal actor defines an implicit rdation between the acts. On the 
right, a spatial actor defines an implicit relation between the objects. 
structure, the result is a constraint network of actors, that is called a world. Whether the actor is 
temporal or spatial it can only fire if all of its inputs and/or outputs are satisfied. Currently CP 
'executes' uch a network (a CP program) with a breadth-first traversal of the network, passing 
tokens to partial states, schematics, chronicles or processes when actors do fire. When an actor 
fires, its time chart (or spatial map) is merged with its global form in such a manner that the 
constraints between moments and intervals or locations and regions are obeyed. It is possible for 
the merge to prove impossible. In this case, the simulation fails, and no final inference may be 
drawn. This is very like a Prolog program that says 'no' to a query, or to an over-constrained 
system of equations that has no solution. 
The end result is a global time chart and a spatial map showing the relationships ofthe various 
regions and time intervals. The two can be correlated through the objects and acts involved. The 
execution of the program is best considered as a simulation of the behavior of that part of the 
world being represented. The success of the simulation (i.e., the successful computation of all 
temporal and spatial constraints) is evidence for the accuracy of the model. If the program fails 
to run, i.e., there are actors left unfired, then the model is inaccurate. This technique forms the 
basis of our problem-solving technique where the schemata re pieced together with the aim of 
producing a successful simulation [2,3]. 
CP, like other constraint satisfaction systems, suffers from potential exponential worst case 
complexity (see, for instance, [11,12]). This will only be a problem in large, pathological cases, 
however. Our experience is that by concentrating on the 'small' cases mentioned before, the 
performance is acceptable. In other words, by limiting the program's size to only be concerned 
with local effects we work around the frame problem, and produce fficient software. Another 
problem involves imulations where cycles of cause and effect are present. One of our examples 
is of a bouncing ball that loses energy as it does so. The simulation has to 'wait' until the ball 
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Figure 14. The  "standard" double-play in baseball. 
[ FIELDER:SS I [ FIELDER:tB ] [ FIELDER2B 
[RUNNER:R I RUNNER:B [ 
Figure 15. The  double-play schematic,  represent ing the spat ia l  conf igurat ion 
of the releva~at objects at the t ime the double-play starts.  
loses all its kinetic energy to discover when the ball will roll instead of bounce, and how many 
times it will bounce. CP provides no meta-level reasoning to infer these results without running 
the simulation. 
8.1. An Eztended Ezample--the Double-Play in Baseball 
We now present an extended example that brings together all of the ideas discussed above. We 
presume that the reader has some familiarity with the American game of baseball, although a
deep understanding of the many complex rules is not necessary. Some of the parts of the example 
have been shown already, when we referred to the throwing and catching of balls. The example 
is the "standard" double-play in baseball. We assume that the batter (B) has hit the ball toward 
short stop (SS) with a man on first base (the runner, R). SS has the ball and attempts to initiate 
the double-play by throwing to second base (2), where the fielder 2B is standing. If 2B catches 
the ball before the runner touches the base, then the runner is out. Fielder 2B, in turn, throws 
to first base (1) where the fielder 1B is standing. Again if 1B catches the ball before the batter 
touches base 1, then he is out. If both throws are successful, then a double-play has been 'turned.' 
Either runner may be out, independently, or neither. Figure 14 is a picture showing the initial 
arrangement of the fielders and runners. Our task is to show how a qualitative framework can be 
set up in which it is possible to apply numeric reasoning to discover whether the double-play will 
succeed or not. We will not show this numeric working, which would involve the actual times, 
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Figure 16. The double-play chronicle, representing the temporal con/igura~ions 
of the relevant events during the double-play. The top graph is the short stop 
throwing to second base before the second baseman catches it and throws 
it to the first baseman, who catches it. The bottom two graphs show the 
independent acts of the two runners, the batter and the base runner. 
THROW CATCH THROW CATCH RUN TAG RUN TAG 
8ALL SS 2B 1B 2 R ! 8 H 
Figure 17. The double-play events/experiences. This shows the (generic, un- 
specified) linkages between the acts on the top row, and the objects on the 
bottom. Read downwards there are eight events; read upwards there are nine 
experiences. 
distances and speeds of runners and the ball as it is thrown, but we will show how tile framework 
call be set tip. 
First, there are three agents involved, the fielders, whose actions need to be coordinated. 
SS throws tile ball to 2B, who catches it, and throws it to 1B who catches it (we assume for 
simplicity, that both fielders are touching their respective bases all the time). Then there are two 
agents, the runners, whose actions are uncoordinated, but it is usual for the runner at first base to 
start running before the ball is hit. The runners run and tag the base to which they are running. 
There may be complications such as "getting a lead," "stealing a base" that we shall ignore. 
llowever, the qualitative analysis hould provide for the runners either succeeding or failing to 
beat their respective throws. There are three objects apart from the human agents. They are 
the ball, and the two bases, I and 2. Figure 16 shows the spatial configuration of objects, and 
Figure 15 shows the temporal configuration of acts. Note that there is no requirement for either 
graph to be connected, especially where no relation can be computed. 
The next diagram, Figure 17 shows, in summary form, the events/experiences. The top line 
shows the acts, a,ld tile bottom line show the objects. No temporal or spatial relations are 
included here. The case relations are omitted for clarity. 
It remains to show how the schematic an be computed from known temporal relations, or the 
chronicle from known spatial ones. If there are some of each that are known, then tt~e missing 
ones can be computed using the same actor-based mechanisms described above. In order to 
reduce the complexity we only show two localized computations, one for a temporal relation and 
one for a spatial relation. 
8.1.1. Computing a Double-Play Temporal Relation 
Figure I8 shows the graphs for catch and throw with their temporal overlays. Below each graph 
is the time chart for the actor. This time chaxt is part of the definition of the graph, i.e., it is 
part of the knowledge of what it is to throw a ball to a fielder or to catch it. Figure 19 shows the 
two combinations of the individual catch and throw time charts (the two graphs join in two ways 
on FIELDER and BALL). It shows that if the sequence of acts is THROW-CATCH (one 
fielder to another) then THROW must precede CATCH (hence the temporal relation computed 
is BFOR). However, if tile sequence is CATCH-THROW (by the same fielder), then there 
is ambiguity. Either the throw comes after the catch, when the fielder hangs on to the bali for 
a period of time, or the throw immediately follows the catch. The ambiguity is show by the 
dashed line for the interval for POSS after CATCH. This indicates a partial ordering among 
the end-points of these intervals, In the CATCH-THROW case we might talk of catch and 
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Figure 18. The graphs for CATCH and THROW, with individual time charts. 
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Figur~ 19. The two possible time dlarts for CATCtl mid THROW combined. 
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throw 'in one rnotion.' These time charts are produced by  constraint propagation through the 
actor network. In this example there are only two actors, but in general there could be a network 
of multiply comtected actors where there are multiple events happening simultaneously. 
8.1.~. Computing a Doable-Play Spatial Relation 
Just as a temporal actor can constrain the end-points of open-ended time intervals, a spatial 
actor can constrain the boundaries of regions. Figure 20 shows a spatial actor constraining tile 
regions occupied by two bases, the runner running between them and the region over which RUN 
precedes TAG. In the example, the only uncertain spatial relations concern the runners, hence 
this actor (one for each runner) is the only one used. The actor constrains the partial chronicle to 
occupy exactly the same region as the runner's, which in turn must touch (the relation BORD) 
both bases. The spatial map is produced by merging the dyadic relation diagrams from Figure 10. 
Here two BORD diagrams have been merged on the region occupied by the runner during the 
time when run comes before tag. 
9. RELATED WORK 
Much of the work presented here matches imilar efforts in either spatial or temporal reason- 
ing. The ontological discussions have their origins in Hayes' work in naive physics [8,13], but 
more philosophical treatments can be found in, for instance, [14]. Related artificial intelligence 
treatments can be found in [15]. Conceptual graphs are becoming popular in a variety of fields. 
Applications are now under way in natural anguage [16], and knowledge acquisition [17], as well 
as numerous knowledge ngineering efforts. Directly related work can be found in [18] and [19] 
where the base conceptual graph theory is used to represent time and temporal happenings. 
Randell and Cohn [10] come to similar conclusions regarding the spatial relations, citing work by 
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Figure 20. The graph for RUNNER with associated spatial map. 
Kautz in [20]. Allen's work in the temporal domain [5] remains eminal, through several attempts 
to build on it. 
The use of explicitly represented inference mechanisms (our spatio-temporal actors) has origins 
in the whole knowledge engineering enterprise, where xplicit meta-rules for control were the name 
of the game (see, for instance, [21]). Shapiro and his co-workers have advocated the inclusion 
of explicit inference nodes in the semazltic networks [22], although we believe we arc the only 
attempt o extend conceptual graphs in the same way. Our network of actors follows work in 
constraint propagation [11,12], although, as we have stated before, we believe that the 'small' 
case nature of our representations can keep the complexity in bounds. 
I0. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that spatial and temporal reasoning can be integrated under a representation 
formalism founded upon dualities in the concepts appropriate in each area. We have defined 
and given examples of the spatial concepts of state, schematic and snapshot, and the temporal 
concepts of process, chronicle and history, as well as the linking concepts of event, experience and 
world. We have also shown how the elements of reasoning with these concepts can be assembled 
into knowledge structures that are capable of representing complex world situations and how, 
through the idea of simulation, such a representation may be validated. A working implemen- 
tation of these ideas, the Conceptual Programming knowledge representation e vironment exists 
and has been used in several reasoning tasks. 
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